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Abstract
This report reviews the applications of decision-related theories (decision theory, utility theory,
probability theory, and game theory) in various aspects of multi-agent systems. In recent years,
multi-agent systems (MASs) have become a highly active research area as multi-agent systems
have a wide range of applications. However, most of real-world environments are very complex
and of uncertainty. An agent’s knowledge about the world is rather incomplete and uncertain.
The actions of the agent are non-deterministic with a range of possible outcomes. The agent may
have many desires that conflict each other. The agent also needs to know about other agents and
decide how to interact with others. These aspects may be handled by the application of
techniques provided by decision-related theories. In this report, the mechanisms of decisionrelated theories are introduced especially a series of typical concepts and methodologies. The
decision problems existing in multi-agent systems that can be handled by decision-related
theories are discussed from different aspects. A variety of applications of decision-related
theories in multi-agent systems are presented especially the application of the series of typical
concepts and methodologies.
Keywords: multi-agent systems, decision theory, probability theory, utility theory, game theory
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1. Introduction
In recent years, multi-agent systems (MASs) have become a highly active research area as multiagent systems have a wide range of applications involving industrial manufacturing, traffic and
transportation, electronic commerce, information management, exploration, entertainment, and
others [Weiss 1999]. In a multi-agent system, there are multiple agents who operate in a specific
environment and can interact with some others. An agent is a computational entity (or a
computer system) that situates in some environment to pursue some set of goals or perform some
set of tasks, and that is autonomous in that its behavior at least partially depends on its own
experience rather than being merely the result of the intervention of humans or other entities
[Wooldridge 1999]. Its function is to interact with its environment, perceive the state of the
environment, and make decisions about how to respond to it [Parsons et al. 2002]. For the
individual agents in a multi-agent system, their function is not only to interact with the
environment but also to interact with other agents, perceive the states of other agents, and make
decisions on how to respond to other agents’ actions.
As a modern approach to distributed artificial intelligence (DAI), one of the long-term goals of
multi-agent systems is to develop mechanisms and methods that enable agents to understand and
interact with other entities in the system as well as humans (or even better). This goal is centered
around agents’ decision making about when and how to interact with whom for pursuing specific
goals or performing specific tasks [Weiss 1999]. Thus when a multi-agent system is designed, an
important objective is to ensure that agents make right and good decisions like humans, typically
the best decision that they can do given what is known. Therefore, decision making, in some
degree, is at the very heart of building multi-agent systems [Parsons et al. 2002].
In simple environments such as blocks-world scenarios studied in early work on artificial
intelligence [Gupta and Nau 1992, Parsons et al. 2002], making right decisions is relatively easy.
The status change of the environment is certain and an agent’s knowledge (or beliefs) about the
environment is complete and correct. An agent has a set of desires and a set of actions each of
which has a single possible outcome that is deterministic. It tries to achieve a single goal and
there are no other agents disrupting it as there is only one agent. As a result, all of what the agent
needs to do is to figure out a plan (i.e., a sequence of actions) that will take it from the current
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known position to the specified goal position. Simply executing those actions in sequence will
transform the initial state to the goal state and definitely lead to the goal being achieved.
However, most of real-world environments are more complex than blocks-world scenarios. The
real-world environment generally changes dynamically, uncertainly, and even is noisy. In such a
complex environment, the initial states that prompt the agents’ decision making process in the
first place may dynamically change while the decision making process is still going on. An agent
may not know the properties of the environment or other agents with certainty. The actions of an
agent are non-deterministic with a range of possible outcomes. The outcome of an agent’s
performing an action might be influenced by other agents’ behavior so different from the
expected. In a noisy environment, an agent’s knowledge about the world, which is acquired by
the agent through sensors, may not be described accurately and is rather incomplete, uncertain,
and even incorrect. An agent may hold many desires that conflict each other. In addition, in a
multi-agent system, there are multiple agents operating in a same environment and they might
have to interact with each other to exchange information and coordinate their behavior. These
agents’ goals may conflict and the outcome of an agent’s action may be influenced by other
agents. Thus an agent needs to know about other agents and decide how to work together with
others, which makes the decision making process of an agent in a multi-agent system more
complex than in a single agent environment.
Decision theory concerns the use of reason in human decision making and can be used to analyze
which options should be taken when it is uncertain exactly what the outcome of taking the option
will be [Lee 1971, Raiffa 1968]. Utility theory rests on decision making and it concerns the use
of profit or cost as the reason upon which the decision is to be based [von Neumann and
Morgenstern 1947]. Both theories provide the analytical method for decision making. Now it is
widely believed that the crucial issue in designing autonomous agents is how to provide these
agents with the ability to select the best action from a range of possible actions. To enable
agents, the computational entities situated in complex environments, to work like humans, the
techniques from decision and utility theory can be applied to handle the decision making issues
in multi-agent systems to some degree. In addition, game theory [von Neumann and Morgenstern
1947], a close relative of decision theory, studies the interaction strategy between entities and
can be applied to help autonomous agents make decisions during interaction since in multi-agent
3

systems, the issue of designing interaction strategies and mechanisms is very important. In fact,
there are many concepts and tools in these theories used in multi-agent systems. These concepts
and tools include probability distribution, multi-attribute utility functions, expected utility
functions, decision trees, Bayesian networks, influence diagrams, Markov decision processes
(MDPs), partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs), Nash equilibria, Pareto
equilibria, and so forth (see Section 2.5).
Although there have been numerous applications of decision-related theories in multi-agent
systems (e.g., [Gmytrasiewicz and Lisetti 2002], [Banerje and Sen 2002], [Bazzan et al. 2002],
[Excelente-Toledo and Jennings 2003], [Stone and Veloso 1998], [Vassileva and Mudgal 2002],
[Nair et al. 2004b]), no review work has yet been conducted to explore the theoretic background
of the applications and build up a close relationship between theories and applications. This
report summarizes the applications of decision theory, utility theory, and other decision-related
theories in multi-agent systems. We take a thorough exploration into this area through presenting
related issues in decision theories with multi-agent systems, discussing decision-theoretic
requirement in multi-agent systems, and describing some typical applications.
The rest of this report is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces decision-related theories, and
presents a series of typical theoretic concepts and methodologies that may be applied into multiagent systems. Section 3 lists some decision problems existing in multi-agent systems that may
be handled in decision-related theories. Section 4 presents a variety of applications of decisionrelated theories in multi-agent systems. Section 5 concludes the report.

2. Decision-Related Theories
A decision is an allocation of resources under control of the decision maker [Horvitz et al. 1988].
Decision theory applies mathematical and statistical methodologies to help provide information
on which decisions can be made. It is based on the axioms of probability and utility. To some
degree, it is a combination of probability theory and utility theory. Game theory is tightly
relevant to decision theory and to a certain degree decision theory can be regarded as the study
on the special case of game theory (see Section 2.4). Taking into account the roles of these
theories in decision making, we call them together as decision-related theories. In this section we
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present the basic mechanisms of these decision-related theories, and also describe some typical
concepts and methodologies provided in these theories.
2.1. Decision Theory
Decision theory is a body of knowledge and related analytical techniques of different degrees of
formality designed to help a decision maker choose among a set of alternatives in light of their
possible outcomes [White 1969, Lee 1971]. It deals with the issues involved with decision
making and concentrates on identifying the “best” decision option. A best decision option
generally is one that maximizes the expected benefit to the decision maker.
2.1.1. History of Decision Theory
The history of decision making originated from the emergence of animals. But the formal
decision theory can be said to start with the 1938 Battle of Britain during World War II
(W.W.II). The English War Department banded together to a group of physicists,
mathematicians, logic experts, crossword puzzle experts, and chess masters to solve the problem
of locating positions for a new but limited technology called “radar”. This group of professionals
were successful enough to be retained thereafter to solve an increasingly more diverse number of
logistic and allocation problems during W.W.II. After the war, the British Government continued
to use this group that they called the “Operational Research” group. Other governments and
industry also saw the advantages of using this type of professionals in improving their
operations. From then on, the decision theory and its applications developed very rapidly [White
1969].
2.1.2. Elements in Decision Problems
There are three primary elements in all decision theory problems: alternatives, states of nature,
and payoffs [White 1969].
Alternatives (also called “choices”, “actions”, or “courses of actions”) are the independent
decision variables. They represent the alternative action choices that decision makers choose
from. A decision making problem is either a pure choice problem when only one alternative is
allowed to be selected, or a mixed choice problem when portions of several alternatives can be
selected at one time. For example, suppose a girl wants to spend a good weekend somewhere and
5

she has three choices: to the beach, to the zoo, and at home. If she can choose only one place
from the three alternatives, it is a pure choice problem. But if she would like to spend different
portions of time at two places, the problem transforms to a mixed choice problem because she
can select two places at one time from all the three, for examples, to the beach in the morning
and to the zoo in the afternoon. Obviously, the pure choice problem is a special case of the mixed
choice problem.
States of nature (also called “states of the world”) are independent events that are assumed to
occur in the future. The occurrence of these events is uncontrollable by the decision maker. In
the weekend example, the weather states (sunny, cloudy, rainy, etc.) can be considered as states
of nature. The girl can choose places from alternatives based on the states of nature but she
cannot control which event will occur in the future.
Payoffs (also called “outcomes” as the results of “actions”) are dependent parameters that are
assumed to occur given a particular alternative is selected and a particular state of nature occurs.
Payoff values may be in terms of profit or cost. In the weekend example, payoff is the happy
degree. There are many possible payoffs corresponding to different combinations of alternatives
and states of nature. For example, generally, the payoff of going to beach is higher than staying
at home in the sunny weather yet lower than staying at home in the rainy weather or lower than
going to zoo in the cloudy weather.
In complex decision problems, how to select a specific action or a specific course of actions from
multiple alternatives is complex since the payoff of the actions may be not obvious and even not
foreseeable at the point of decision making. So in most cases the elements of a decision problem
is not limited within the above three. The strategies that conduct the selection of alternatives are
also an important element in decision problems [Raiffa 1968, White 1969], which can be
regarded as the extension of the “alternatives” element.
2.1.3. Types of Decision Environments
Decision theory can apply to three primary types of environments: under certainty, under risk,
and under uncertainty.
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Decision under certainty means that each alternative leads to one and only one outcome, and a
choice among alternatives is equivalent to a choice among outcomes. Under this environment the
decision maker knows clearly what the alternatives are to choose from and knows clearly the
payoffs that each choice will bring with certainty if the alternative is chosen. In the weekend
example, if the girl definitely knows the weather status, she can decide which place to go in a
certain manner to maximize her happiness.
In decision under risk, each alternative will have one of several possible outcomes, and the
probability of occurrence for each outcome is known. Therefore, each alternative is associated
with a probability distribution, and a choice among probability distributions. Under this
environment some information on the states of nature and corresponding payoffs is available but
is presented in a probabilistic fashion. In the weekend example, if the girl knows the occurrence
probabilities of different weather states, she can make a decision under risk.
Decision under uncertainty occurs when the probability distributions are unknown. Under this
environment no information about the likelihood of states of nature occurring is available. The
decision maker can only assume that a particular payoff will occur if a given state of nature
occurs. In the weekend example, if the girl has no any idea of the weather, the payoffs of
alternatives might be estimated, but are only assumed to occur in an uncertain environment. They
are not known with any degree of certainty.
The three environments are on a linear continuum ranging from complete knowledge (under
certainty), to partial knowledge (under risk), and finally to no knowledge (under uncertainty).
Indeed, the uncertainty cases can be reduced to the risk cases by assigning an equal probability to
each state of nature, or using subjective probabilities based on expert assessments or on analysis
of previous decisions made in similar circumstances. Hence, in the following sections, we use a
unified term, uncertainty, to refer to both uncertainty cases and risk cases.
2.2. Probability Theory
The foundations of probability theory extend at least as far back as the seventeenth century in the
works of Pascal, Bernoulli, and Fermat [Apostol 1969]. Probability theory concerns the analysis
of random events. The outcome of a random event cannot be determined before it occurs, and it
may be any one of several possible outcomes. The actual outcome is determined by a probability
7

[Wendt and Vlek 1975]. Probability is the numerical expression of the possibility of event
occurrence, measurable in an uncertain situation. The notion for the probability of the occurrence
of an event X conditioned on a state of information S may be specified as P ( X | S ) . A classical
axiomatization of probability contains the following definitions where Y is also an event like X:
0 <= P ( X | S ) <= 1
P ( X | S ) + P(not X | S) = 1

P (X or Y | S) = P ( X | S ) + P (Y | S ) - P (X and Y | S)
P (X and Y | S) = P ( X | Y , S ) * P (Y | S )

Probability theory and the more encompassing decision theory provide principles for rational
inference and decision making under uncertainty [Horvitz et al. 1988]. Probability provides a
language for making statements about uncertainty and thus makes explicit the notion of
incomplete information. Decision theory extends this language to allow people to make
statements about what alternative actions are and how alternative outcomes are valued relative to
one another.
Decision theory adds probability measures that indicate the likelihood of each possible outcome
for each alternative into the belief (the knowledge about the state of nature) of the decision
maker. Decision theory supposes that the decision maker does not know the actual situation, but
does have beliefs or expectations about the consequences of a choice in different states. A
probability of 100% corresponds to the absolute belief on a certain consequence of the choice, a
probability of 0% to belief on the impossibility of the consequence of the choice, and intervening
values to partial belief or knowledge on the consequence of the choice. From this perspective, in
decision theory, probabilities are properties of the state of knowledge of the decision maker
rather than properties of the event occurrence. Sets of belief assignments that are consistent with
the axioms of probability theory are said to be coherent. A rational person would wish to make
decisions based on coherent beliefs.
2.3. Utility Theory
In economics, utility means the real or expected ability of a good or service to satisfy a human
want. In decision theory, utility is a measure of the desirability of outcomes of courses of actions
8

that applies to decision making under uncertainty with known probabilities [White 1969]. The
utility of an action is usually some function of the cost, benefit, risk, and other properties of the
action. Utility theory [von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947] is an analytical method for making
a decision concerning an action to take, given a set of multiple criteria upon which the decision is
to be based. Utility theory originated from the eighteenth century, and has significantly grown up
from the beginning of the twentieth century [Fishburn 1970].
Decision making serves as the foundation on which utility theory rests [von Neumann and
Morgenstern 1947]. Among a set of alternatives, a decision maker would rather implement a
more preferred alternative than one that is less preferred. The preferences refer to the ordering
relationship among alternatives in the opinion of the decision maker and may be represented in
terms of utilities for outcomes and probabilities for states of nature.
2.3.1. Utility Functions
We may represent the set of preferences by means of a numerical utility function U ( x, d )
[Horvitz et al. 1988], one of the central issues in utility theory, which assigns a number on a
cardinal scale instead of an ordinal scale (on preferences) to each outcome x and decision
alternative d, indicating the relative desirability, and ranks the alternatives in a linear order
according to degrees of desirability, so that U ( x A , A) < U ( xB , B) whenever x A

xB and

U ( x A , A) = U ( xB , B) whenever x A ~ xB , where x A and xB are the outcome of decision A and the
outcome of decision B respectively, x A ~ xB means the same desirability degree of x A and xB ,
and x A

xB means xB is more preferred (desirable) than x A . By working with utility functions

instead of sets of preferences, the rational choice of a decision maker is to maximize utility. The
same set of preferences may be presented by many different utility functions, as any strictly
increasing transformation of a utility function will provide the same choices under maximization.
2.3.2. Expected Utilities

Amounts of cardinal utility can be added and subtracted to produce other amounts of utility. This
makes it possible to combine the utilities foreseen in different possible outcomes into the
expected utility, the utility of all possible outcomes weighted by their probability of occurrence.
Formally, the expected utility can be represented as E[U ( X , d ) | S ] =

P( x | S )U ( x, d ) , where X
x∈ X
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is the set of all possible outcomes generated from the decision d and S is the state of information.
When a decision maker has multiple decision alternatives and there is risk or uncertainty about
their individual outcomes, the preferred decision d is the one that maximizes the expected utility
E[U ( X , d ) | S ] over the probability distribution for X.

The concepts of utility function and expected utility can be integrated to get expected utility
functions (see Section 2.5.2).
2.4. Game Theory

Game theory [von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947, Raiffa 1968, Binmore 1992], a theory of
interdependent choice founded by von Neumann in 1928, is a close relative of decision theory.
Game theory studies interactions between self-interested entities. In particular, it studies the
problems of how interaction strategies can be designed that will maximize the welfare of an
entity in an encounter, and how protocols or mechanisms can be designed that have certain
desirable properties.
Decision theory is often claimed to enable an entity to make the most rational choice, so it
provides a means of making rational decisions under uncertainty [Raiffa 1968]. Similarly, game
theory provides a rational means of analyzing interactions between entities. Decision theory can
be considered as the study of games against nature. The game against nature is the simplest type
of games, where a single player makes a decision in the face of nature and the nature is an
opponent that just acts randomly without the desire of gaining the best payoff or defeating the
opponent [Binmore 1992].
Game theory concerns games of strategy [von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947, Burger 1959].
The elements of such a game include: (1) playersdecision makers in the game, (2)
actionschoices available to a player, (3) informationknowledge that a player has when
making a decision, (4) strategiesrules that tell a player which action to take at each point of the
game, (5) outcomesresults that unfold, (6) payoffsutilities that each player realizes for a
particular outcome, and (7) equilibriastable results. Here stable results mean that each player
behaves in the desired manner and will not change its decision.
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In contrast to pure games of chance (e.g., the guess game in which one player guesses whether
there is something in another player’s hand), the outcome of the games of strategy does not
depend on chance alone, but also on certain decisions that the players must take during the
course of play. These decisions and certain random events determine the course of play. A player
can be an individual, or a group of individuals functioning as a decision making unit. The
strategies available to players to bring about particular outcomes can be decomposed into a
sequence of decisions called choices. Players are assumed to be able to evaluate and compare the
consequences associated with the set of possible outcomes and assign utilities to each outcome
indicating a preference relationship among them.
The concept of equilibria constitutes a viable solution to games [Stirling et al. 2002]. An
equilibrium for a game corresponds to a vector of options (one element for each player), or joint
option, such that each player’s individual option is acceptable to it according to some criterion.
There are three most widely used equilibrium concepts: dominant equilibria, Nash equilibria, and
Pareto equilibria [Sandholm 1999]. A joint option is a dominant equilibrium if each individual
option is best for the corresponding player, no matter what options the other players choose. A
joint option is a Nash equilibrium if, were any single agent to change its decision, it would
reduce its level of satisfaction. A joint option is a Pareto equilibrium if no single agent, by
changing its decision, can increase its level of satisfaction without lowering the satisfaction level
of at least one other agent. We will discuss these three types of equilibria further in Section 2.5
where we present a series of typical theoretic tools.
Obviously, game theory is closely related with decision theory and utility theory. Compared to
the three primary elements of a generic decision problem (alternatives, states of nature, and
payoffs) described in section 2.1.2, the composition of a game is more complex than the
composition of a generic decision problem. On one hand, a game has all the elements of a
generic decision problem such as playersthis element is hidden and relatively simple in a
decision problem where the players are decision maker(s) and the nature (or the world in which
decision maker(s) work), actions (the element of alternatives in a decision problem), information
(the element of states of nature in a decision problem), outcomes and payoffs which are
expressed as one single element “payoffs” in a decision problem. On the other hand, the basic
element strategies of a game is just an advanced element appearing in complex decision
11

problems, and a decision problem does not concern the element equilibria which stabilizes the
opponents’ strategies.
2.5. Decision-Theoretic Concepts and Methodologies

Based on the previously described mechanisms, the presented decision-related theories provide a
series of concepts and methodologies that can be applied into varieties of areas involved with
decision making such as economics, sociology, military strategy, and so forth. The following are
some typical concepts and methodologies.
2.5.1. Probability Distribution

Probability distribution is an important component in probability theory [Feller 1968]. It is also
called probability function that describes all the values that the random variable can take and the
probability associated with each. The term of probability distribution covers both discrete
probability distribution (function) and continuous probability distribution (function).
Discrete probability functions are referred to as probability mass functions. The mathematical
definition of a discrete probability function, p (x) , is a function that satisfies the following
properties: (1) the probability that x can take a specific value is

p (x) , that is,

P[ X = x] = p( x) = px , (2) p (x) is non-negative for all real x, and (3) the sum of p (x) over all
pi = 1 where i represents all possible values that x can have

possible values of x is 1, that is,
i

and pi is the probability at xi . One consequence of properties (2) and (3) is that 0 <= p (x) <= 1.
Continuous probability functions are referred to as probability density functions. The
mathematical definition of a continuous probability function, f (x) , is a function that satisfies
the following properties: (1) the probability that x is between two points a and b is
p[a ≤ x ≤ b] =

b
a

f ( x)dx , (2) f (x) is non-negative for all real x, and (3) the integral of the

probability function is 1, that is,

∞
−∞

f ( x)dx = 1 .
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Probability distribution provides a quantitative way of estimating the occurrence chance of an
event and the possible outcome of an action. It has been widely used in a variety of uncertain
situations.
2.5.2. Multi-Attribute Utility Functions and Expected Utility Functions

Multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) [Hill et al. 1982, Keeney and Raiffa 1976, Sycara 1988]
provides a formal basis for describing or prescribing choices between alternatives whose
consequences are characterized by multiple attributes. It is based on the fundamental axiom that
a decision maker attempts to maximize some utility function U = U ( g1 , g 2 , ) which aggregates
all the different viewpoints currently taken into account. In the utility function, each parameter,
gi , represents an estimated value for a specific attribute. Such aggregation into a single
numerical measure allows classical optimization algorithms to be applied to multi-criterion
problems [Barber et al. 2000].
Multi-attribute utility theory has been widely used in situations where the decision making
depends on multiple factors and the utility calculation of decision alternatives is based on
multiple attributes. The multi-attribute utility functions are used more often than general single
attribute utility functions in complex environments where a decision maker needs to evaluate the
alternatives from different viewpoints (i.e., attributes).
Based on the description of the concept expected utility in Section 2.3.3, the expected utility
function provides a formalized method to combine the utilities foreseen in different possible
outcomes into the expected utility, the utility of all possible outcomes weighted by their
probabilities of occurrence. Formally, the expected utility function of a decision d is represented
as EU (d ) =

P( x | S )U ( x, d ) , where X is the set of all possible outcomes generated from the
x∈ X

decision d and S is the state of information. When a decision maker has multiple decision
alternatives and there is risk or uncertainty about their individual outcomes, the preferred
decision d is the one that maximizes the expected utility over the probability distribution for X.
2.5.3. Decision Trees

Decision trees are the graphical representation of decisions involved in the choice of statistical
procedures [Horvitz et al. 1988]. A decision tree is a map of the reasoning process. It can help
13

decision makers form an accurate, balanced picture of the risks and rewards that can result from
a particular choice and help them to do what-if analysis or predict the unseen behavior in the
future. Figure 2.1 shows the example structure of decision trees, where a small square indicates a
decision and a circle represents an uncertain result of taking the decision. Starting from the
leftmost square and going along any series of branches, the decision maker can estimate the
results of the corresponding choices and take actions that can achieve the goal or maximize the
benefit.
Decision trees are excellent tools for making number-based decisions where a lot of complex
information needs to be taken into account. They provide a framework to quantify the values of
outcomes of alternatives and the probabilities of achieving them.

Figure 2.1. The structure of a decision tree.

Figure 2.2. The structure of a Bayesian network.

2.5.4. Bayesian Networks

Bayesian networks (also called belief networks, Bayesian belief networks, causal probabilistic
networks, or causal networks) [Pearl 1988, Neapolitan 1990] are directed acyclic graphs in
which nodes represent random variables and arcs represent direct probabilistic dependences
among them. They model the distribution of observations (prior knowledge) and represent
probabilistic relations among uncertain variables describing the domain at hand. The structure of
a Bayesian network follows the causal structure of the modeled domain. The causal structure
gives a modular insight into the interactions among the variables and allows for prediction of
effects of manipulation. Figure 2.2 shows the example structure of Bayesian networks.
Bayesian networks are built upon Bayes’ theorem. Bayes’ theorem allows people to reverse the
direction of inference. Given a state of information S and the influence of hypothesis H on
14

observable evidence E, expressed as P ( E | H , S ) , the influence of E on H can be computed,
expressed as P ( H | E , S ) . Bayes’ theorem can be simply written as:

P( H | E , S ) =

P( E | H , S ) P ( H | S )
, or
P( E | S )

P( E | H , S ) =

P( H | E , S ) P ( E | S )
P( H | S )

This bi-directionality is a consequence of Bayes’ theorem. The inferential symmetry of
probability reasoning can be useful when probabilities are available in one direction but are
required in the reverse direction.
Bayesian networks are an important methodology provided by decision theory and probability
theory. They are very useful in showing the structure of the domain (i.e., the structure of the
decision problem), probabilistic inference, and causal relationship learning. Based on the
network, a decision maker can assess and refine probability distributions, and learn causal
relationships between nodes. They have been widely used in applications where inference is
needed. Compared to decision trees, Bayesian networks are more complex and more powerful in
representing complex decision problems, especially when a decision problem exhibits many
symmetries where bi-directional reasoning is very natural and easy to implement in Bayesian
networks.
2.5.5. Influence Diagrams (IDs)

Influence diagrams (also called probability influence diagrams, decision influence diagrams, or
relevance diagrams) [Howard and Matheson 1984, Neapolitan 1990, Shachter 1988] are
Bayesian networks extended with utility functions and variables representing decisions. They are
especially suited for modeling decision problems. The goal of influence diagram modeling is
choosing such a decision option that will lead to the highest expected utility. An influence
diagram is a directed acyclic graph which contains four types of nodes (decision, chance,
deterministic, and value) and two types of arcs (influences and informational arcs). Figure 2.3
shows the example structure of influence diagrams, where rectangles represent decision nodes,
ovals represent chance nodes, double ovals represent deterministic nodes, and diamonds
represent value nodes.
15

Figure 2.3. The structure of an influence diagram.

In Figure 2.3, decision nodes include a specification of the decision options available to the
decision maker. Chance nodes are random variables and they represent uncertain quantities
relevant to the decision problem. They are quantified by conditional probability distributions.
Deterministic nodes represent either constant values or values determined from the states of their
parent nodes. It means if the values of its parents are known, the value of a deterministic node is
also known with certainty. Deterministic nodes are quantified similarly to chance nodes. The
only difference is that their probability tables contain all zeros or ones as there is no uncertainty
about the outcome of a deterministic node once all its parents are known. Value nodes represent
utility, which is a measure of desirability of the outcomes of the decision process. They are
quantified by the utility of each of the possible combinations of outcomes of the parent nodes.
Normally, an arc in an influence diagram denotes an influence, which means that the node at the
tail of the arc influences the value (or the probability distribution over the possible values) of the
node at the head of the arc. So they have a causal meaning. However, the arcs coming into
decision nodes have a different meaning. These arcs are informational ones representing
temporal precedence (in the sense of information flow). The outcomes of all nodes at the tail of
informational arcs should have been known before the decision is made.
The influence diagram is an important tool provided by decision theory, probability theory, and
utility theory together. They can represent multiple objectives and allow tradeoffs in one area
against costs in another. Similar to Bayesian networks, influence diagrams are very useful in
showing the structure of the domain, i.e., the structure of the decision problem. Different from
the qualitative illustration of the structure of the domain provided by Bayesian networks,
influence diagrams allow accounting for uncertainty and are able to represent it in a quantitative
way. Unlike decision trees, influence diagrams do not grow exponentially and they support
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reverse inference very easily. They also suppress trivial details and hence are suitable for getting
an overview of a complex problem.
2.5.6. Markov Decision Processes (MDPs)

Markov decision processes (MDPs) [Howard 1960, Boutilier et al. 1999] were developed within
the context of operations research. In essence a Markov decision process is an iterative set of
classical decision problems. At a conceptual level, most decision problems involved with
sequential actions and states can be viewed as instances of Markov decision processes. A
Markov decision process can be described with a graph. A state of the world (or an
environmental state) can be represented as a node in a graph. Carrying out an action in that state
will result in a transition to one of a number of states, each connected to the first state by an arc,
with some probability, and will incur some cost. After a series of transitions a goal state may be
reached. The sequence of actions carried out is called a policy, which is a mapping from
environmental states to actions. Solving an MDP amounts to finding a minimal cost policy for
moving from some initial state to a goal state.
Formally, an MDP is defined as a tuple < S , A, T , R > [Cassandra et al. 1994], where S is a finite
set of environmental states that can be reliably identified by the decision maker; A is a finite set
of actions; T is a state transition model of the environment, which is a function mapping
elements of S × A into discrete probability distributions over S; and R is a reward function
mapping to the real numbers that specify the instantaneous reward that the agent derives from
taking an action in a state. The state transition model T can be written as T ( s, a, s ' ) for the
probability that the environment will make a transition from the previous state s to the current
state s ' when action a was taken. The reward function can be written as R ( s, a ) for the
immediate reward to the decision maker for taking action a in state s. The policy π , mapping
from S to A, specifies an action to be taken in each situation.
MDPs can capture many of the facets of real-world problems and are often used in decision
making based on the history up to now. An environment is regarded as holding Markov property
if the environment’s response at time t+1 depends only on the state and action representations at
time t. If an environment has the Markov property, then its one-step dynamics enable us to
predict the next state and expected next reward given the current state and action. Iteratively one
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can predict all future states and expected rewards from knowledge of the current state as well as
the complete history up to the current time. It also follows that Markov states provide the best
possible basis for choosing actions. That is, the best policy for choosing actions as a function of a
Markov state is just as good as the best policy for choosing actions as a function of the complete
history.
MDPs can be used to formalize the domains in which actions have probabilistic results and the
decision maker has direct access to the state of the environment. An important aspect of the
MDP model is that it provides the basis for algorithms that provably find optimal policies given a
stochastic model of the environment and a goal [Howard 1960]. MDP models play an important
role in research on planning and learning. But the assumption of complete observability to the
states provides a significant obstacle to their application to real-world problems [Cassandra et al.
1994].
2.5.7. Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs)

As a generalization of MDPs, the partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs)
also originated in the operation research literature. MDPs apply to the decision problems where
the state information can be observed completely. In most real-world decision problems like
machine maintenance and quality control, however, the problem settings are of state uncertainty
where the state information is partially observable. A POMDP permits uncertainty regarding the
state of an MDP and allows state information acquisition [Cassandra et al. 1994]. When the state
is not completely observable, a model of observation must be added to represent the uncertainty
of the state acquired. The model of observation includes a finite set of possible observations for
the decision maker and an observation function representing the probability distributions over
observations.
Formally, a POMDP is defined as a tuple < S , A, T , Ω, O, R > [Cassandra et al. 1994], where S, A,
T, and R are similar to those in the definition of an MDP; Ω is a finite set of possible
observations for the decision maker; and O is an observation function mapping A × S into
discrete probability distributions over Ω . The observation function can be written as O (a, s,ω )
for the probability of making observation ω from the current state s after having taken action a.
The policy π , mapping from Ω to A, specifies an action to be taken in each situation.
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POMDPs are used for describing planning tasks in which the decision maker does not have
complete information as to its current state. The POMDP model provides an elegant solution to
the decision problem of acting in partially observable domains, treating actions that affect the
environment and actions that only affect the decision maker’s state of information uniformly. As
a result, the POMDP model provides a convenient way of reasoning about tradeoffs between
actions to gain reward and actions to gain information.
2.5.8. Nash Equilibria and Pareto Equilibria

Game theory assumes that one has opponents who are adjusting their strategies according to
what they believe everybody else is doing. The exact level of sophistication of the opponents
should be part of one’s strategy. Sometimes it is possible for a player to take a dominant strategy
to be best off no matter what strategies other players use. However, often a player’s best strategy
depends on what strategies other players choose. In such settings, dominant strategies do not
exist, and other stability criteria are needed [Sandholm 1999]. If the players are disposed to
cooperate, they may seek a Pareto equilibrium. A self-interest player in a game, however, would
have no incentive to choose a Pareto equilibrium unless it would join a coalition. The concept of
Nash equilibria [Nash 1950] is consistent with an attitude of exclusive self-interest and it is the
most basic one of the stability criteria. If there is a set of strategies with the property that no
player can benefit by changing her strategy while the other players keep their strategies
unchanged, then that set of strategies and the corresponding payoffs constitute the Nash
equilibrium.

3. Decision-Theoretic Requirement in Multi-Agent Systems
Multi-agent systems are composed of a group of autonomous and distributed entities called
agents, operating in an environment and interacting with one another to collectively achieve their
goals [Weiss 1999]. In this section, we will discuss the decision-theoretic requirements in multiagent systems from the perspective of BDI (Belief-Desire-Intention) architectures [Rao and
Georgeff 1995, Wooldridge 1999]. Specifically, we discuss from the perspective of agents’
attitudes such as the beliefs of agents to the states of the world, what the agents desire to do, and
how the agents are intended to act in different situations, which consist of the BDI architecture.
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The range of requirements discussed varies widely from an individual agent’s knowledge
representation to the coordination among multiple agents.
The research work on multi-agent systems involves a variety of aspects. We can discuss the
decision-theoretic requirements in multi-agent systems from many perspectives like logic-based
architectures and layered architectures [Wooldridge 1999]. Here we discuss the decisiontheoretic requirements in multi-agent systems from the perspective of BDI architectures as the
central issues of multi-agent system design include: how should an agent represent knowledge,
and how should the agent operate on it to arrive at purposeful actions [Newell 1981]. The BDI
architecture, very popular in the multi-agent system community, focuses on these issues. It
evolves from a philosophical model of human practical reasoning (originally developed by
Michael Bratman [Bratman 1987], see Section 3.2) and is intuitive—we all recognize the
processes of deciding what to do and then how to do it, which are closely related with decision
theory. In addition, the BDI architecture gives us a clear functional decomposition [Wooldridge
1999], which indicates the design requirement of building an autonomous agent in multi-agent
systems. This enables us to discuss the decision-theoretic requirement clearly and systematically.
In this section, we will address the relationship between decision-related theories and agents’
beliefs, desires, and intentions, and discuss the specific decision-theoretic requirements from the
above aspects.
3.1. Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

Fundamentally, an agent is an active entity with the ability to perceive, reason, and act in order to
satisfy its design objectives. An agent has the ability to communicate. This ability is part
perception (the receiving of messages) and part action (the sending of messages) [Huhns and
Stephens 1999]. An agent has a set of goals (or desires), certain capabilities to perform actions
(conducted by intentions), and some knowledge (or beliefs) about its environment. Agents are
assumed to have explicitly represented knowledge and mechanism for operating on or drawing
inferences from their knowledge. As an autonomous entity, frequently, an agent needs to make
decisions based on currently held beliefs (states of nature) to take specific actions (select
alternatives) and achieve specified goals (maximize payoffs or utilities) even in the simplest
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environment. In complex environments of such characteristics as dynamism and uncertainty,
decision making is especially important and necessary.
The behavior of agents operating in multi-agent systems may be reactive or rational [Weiss
1999]. Being reactive means that the agent is capable of maintaining an ongoing interaction with
the environment, and responding in a timely fashion to changes that occur in it; while being
rational means that the agent behaves in a way that is suitable or even optimal for goal
attainment. When there are multiple alternatives to select, decision making is necessary no
matter whether in a reactive manner or in a rational manner the agent behaves. For the rational
behavior, strategy-related long-term decision making is more important.
Multi-agent environments provide an infrastructure for communication and interaction among
agents. Agents in multi-agent systems communicate and interact in order to achieve better the
goals of themselves or of the society/system in which they operate [Huhns and Stephens 1999].
The environments are typically open and have no centralized designer. The designers of a multiagent system may not know others’ design objectives very well. Since the design of an agent’s
characteristics and behavior eventually depends on its designer, the non-centralized design
makes the agents not know other agents in the system very well. Even if the system design is
centralized, the autonomous behavior of agents may make others operate in an unpredictable,
and hence dynamic and uncertain, environment. There can be multiple actions possibly to take at
the moment and one same action can result in multiple possible outcomes. To perceive the
environmental states, act and interact in uncertain situations, decision-theoretic tools are useful
for agents.
3.2. The BDI (Belief-Desire-Intention) Architecture

The BDI architecture originated from the philosophical tradition of understanding practical
reasoning—the process of deciding moment by moment which action to perform in the
furtherance of the goals (i.e., a mutually consistent set of desires [Kraus et al. 1998, Singh et al.
1999]) [Bratman 1987, Wooldridge 1999]. Practical reasoning involves two important processes:
deciding what goals to achieve, and how to achieve these goals. The former process is known as
deliberation, the latter as means-ends reasoning. For a specific procedure of practical reasoning
of an agent, the decision process typically begins by the agent’s trying to understand what
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options available given the current situation. After generating the set of alternatives, the decision
maker must choose among alternatives, and commit to some. These chosen options will become
intentions, which then determine the agent’s actions. Intentions then feed back into the agent’s
future practical reasoning. We will further describe the practical reasoning and its two processes
later in this section.
There are seven main components in a generic BDI architecture [Wooldridge 1999]: (1) a set of
current beliefs, representing information the agent has about its current environment; (2) a belief
revision function, which takes a perceptual input and the agent’s current beliefs, and on the basis
of these, determines a new set of beliefs; (3) an option generation function, which determines the
options available to the agent (its desires), on the basis of its current beliefs about its
environment and its current intentions; (4) a set of current options (desires), representing
possible courses of actions available to the agent; (5) a filter function, which represents the
agent’s main deliberation process, and which determines the agent’s intentions on the basis of its
current beliefs, desires, and intentions. The desires originally generated may be inconsistent
while the goal set is a consistent subset of desires. The agent forms intentions to make the goals
true; (6) a set of current intentions, representing the agent’s current foci—those states of affairs
that it has committed to trying to bring about; and (7) an action selection function, which
determines an action to perform on the basis of current intentions. Figure 3.1 illustrates the
schema of a generic BDI architecture of the above main components.
From Figure 3.1, we see that the basic components of a Belief-Desire-Intention architecture are
data structures representing the beliefs, desires, and intentions of an agent, and functions
representing its deliberation (deciding what intentions to have—i.e., deciding what to do) and
means-ends reasoning (deciding how to achieve—i.e., how to do) where the belief revision
function is the basis of the agent’s deliberation process. Beliefs represent what the agent knows
about the states of the world, desires describe the specific states of the world the agent prefers to
achieve, and intentions lead to the agent’s actions. They are represented as sets (i.e., as
unstructured collections) respectively. Let Bel be the set of all possible beliefs, Des be the set of
all possible desires, and Int be the set of all possible intentions. Their values are acquired from
the corresponding functions. Representing an agent’s intentions as a set is generally too
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simplistic in practice [Wooldridge 1999]. A more practical way is to associate a priority with
each intention, indicating its relative importance.
Sensor
input
Belief revision function

Beliefs
Option generation function

Desires

Deliberation

Filter function

Intentions
Means-ends
reasoning

Action selection function
Action
output

Figure 3.1. Schematic diagram of a generic BDI architecture [Wooldridge 1999].

An agent’s belief revision function is a mapping from the current perception and a set of current
beliefs to a new set of beliefs: ℘( Bel ) × P → ℘( Bel ) . The option generation function is a
mapping from a set of beliefs and a set of intentions to a set of desires:
℘( Bel ) ×℘( Int ) → ℘( Des ) . We can regard an agent’s option generation process as one of

recursively elaborating a hierarchical plan structure, considering and committing to progressively
more specific intentions, until finally it reaches the intentions that correspond to immediately
executable actions. The filter function is a mapping from the previously held intentions and the
current beliefs and desires to the updated intentions: ℘( Bel ) ×℘( Des ) ×℘( Int ) → ℘( Int ) . It
represents the agent’s deliberation process (deciding what to do). The action selection function is
assumed to simply return any executable intention—one that corresponds to a directly executable
action: ℘( Int ) → A . Combining these four functions together, we can get an outlined action
function of an agent, which is a mapping from perceptions to actions: P → A [Wooldridge
1999].
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Taking into consideration of the basic components of a generic BDI architecture, what need to be
concerned in the design of BDI agents correspond to the two central issues of multi-agent system
design mentioned before: how should an agent represent knowledge, and how should the agent
operate on it to arrive at purposeful actions? Decision theory provides an answer by postulating
that probability (to represent what an agent knows) and utility (to represent what an agent
prefers) be combined to define the agent’s behavior that maximizes its expected utility or
achieves its goals.
3.3. Decision Theory and Agents’ Beliefs

In this section, we will discuss the decision-theoretic requirement in multi-agent systems based
on the issues related with agents’ beliefs. Our discussion involves the first two components of the
BDI architecture: the belief revision function, and the generated beliefs.
In a complex environment, which may be noisy and change dynamically and uncertainly, the
perceived information by an agent may be inaccurate and an agent is inherently uncertain about
the environment as well as other agents. Even if the environment itself is noiseless, static, and
certain, other agents’ behavior may make the agent operating in an unpredictable thus uncertain
environment. Formally, the information the agent has about the state of the current world (both
the environment and agents) is called belief. Each agent has its own beliefs about how the world
is. These beliefs come from the agent’s perception and cognition of the states of the world. In an
uncertain environment, an agent cannot exactly discriminate among the states of the world. The
fact that the actual state may be unknown to the agent can be formalized by specifying the set of
all possible states of the world, S, together with a family of probability distributions, P (S ) , over
these states. Each of these distributions specifies which of these states are currently possible and
how likely they are. Thus the probability distributions can be used to describe the information the
agent has about the present state of the world.
As a result, decision theory, especially probability theory, can play a significant role in the
definition of agents’ belief revision functions and the formalization of agents’ beliefs. Further, to
model the distribution of knowledge and represent probabilistic relations among them, Bayesian
networks and influence diagrams can be applied to create the possible relationship between
beliefs for causal reasoning. Based on the beliefs it holds, an agent will generate a set of options
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possible to achieve and decide what actions to do. To find an optimal sequence of actions from
the present state to a goal state, Markov decision processes (MDPs) can be applied. MDPs
assume that it is possible to measure some aspect of the world and from this measurement the
state of the world can be known precisely. In realistic situations, however, from the measurement
something can be uncertainly inferred about the world. In such a situation, the states of an MDP
are replaced by beliefs about those states, resulting in the application of partially observable
Markov decision processes (POMDPs).
3.4. Decision Theory and Agents’ Deliberation

In this section, we will discuss the decision-theoretic requirement in multi-agent systems from
the aspect of agents’ deliberation processes. Our discussion involves the three components of the
BDI architecture: the option generation function, desires, and the filter function, which compose
an agent’s deliberation process (deciding what to do). Compared to the tactical decision making
on specific action selection possibly involved in the succeeding means-ends reasoning process,
the decision making in this process is strategic. In this process, courses of actions (plans) will be
decided.
In the agent’s deliberation process, a set of desires are generated and the agent has the will to
fulfill these desires. At any given time, the agent selects a consistent subset of its desires. This
serves as its set of current goals. The set of goals motivates the agent’s planning process which
filters out its intentions [Kraus et al. 1998]. Our discussion will focus on the decision-theoretic
requirement in agents’ desires and goals generation, (individual) planning, and the coordination
to (individual) planning, which is crucial in multi-agent systems [Huhns and Stephens 1999].
3.4.1. Agents’ Desires and Goals Generation

An agent’s desires refer to the states of affairs toward which the agent has a positive disposition
[Wooldridge 1999]. A desire represents some desired end state of the world based on the agent’s
current beliefs. Each agent has its own desires about how it would like the world to be like. The
concept of desire is closely related with another concept of preference as the desires of an agent
to do something indicate its preferences over the possible outcomes or states. The preferences
refer to the ordering relationship among alternatives in the agent’s opinion. The preferences and
desires come from the agent’s user or owner. Since in multi-agent systems an agent’s behavior
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motivation is to maximize the expected benefit for itself (if it is self-interested) or for a group of
agents (if it is cooperative) (see Section 3.4.2), the need to maximize payoffs of preferences
essentially requires that there be a scalar representation for all the preferences of an agent. In
other words, all of the preferences must be reduced to a single scalar with which they can be
precisely compared. This requires identification, evaluation, and comparison of alternative
solutions before the best solution is selected. Obviously, utility theory, especially utility function,
can play a significant role in this task. When an agent needs to select some alternatives from a set
of alternatives, it can evaluate the utility of each alternative following specific criterion.
Sometimes this evaluation procedure is very simple. For example, if the agent only considers the
cost to achieve a desire, it can just select the one with the minimal cost. So this is a single
attribute utility function. If the agent needs to take into account multiple factors, the use of multiattribute utility functions is necessary and the agent needs to assign corresponding weight values
to those factors according to the different contributions of the factors to the utility computation.
The set of an agent’s desires may not always be consistent. For example, an agent (or a person)
may desire to get a doctoral degree, do lifelong research, enjoy parties everyday, interact with
kinds of people as often as possible, and so on. However, the first two desires and the succeeding
two desires lead to a contradiction generally and it is not possible to get all desires satisfied. The
agent needs to select a consistent subset of its desires—goal set—to achieve. For all the goal sets
in this example ({get a doctoral degree, do lifelong research}, {enjoy parties everyday, interact
with kinds of people as often as possible}, etc.), the agent may ascribe different degrees of
importance to them. Then he can select one with the highest importance degree from all the goal
sets [Kraus et al. 1998]. Since each goal set may consist of more than one desire, it is not certain
that the utility values of all desires in one goal set are higher than the utility values of all desires
in another goal set. Otherwise, the agent can simply select the goal set in which each desire has a
higher utility value than any desire in any other goal set. To compare the importance degrees of
all goal sets, it is necessary to apply the utility function into the computation of the importance
degrees (utilities) of goal sets, which is similar to the application of utility function in desires
generation.
However, it is not enough for an agent to generate goals only depending on the importance
degrees of different goal sets. Such an agent only tries to achieve the most important goals
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irrespective of the possibility of achieving those goals. In the above example, even if the agent
realizes that the first goal set is the most important one, he needs to give up those goals if his
academic record is always very bad and he has been fifty years old. To build sensible agents, the
probability of achieving goals needs to be taken into account together with the utility
computation, which results in the application of the expected utility theory. The expected utility
of a goal set can be calculated with the product of the probability of achieving the goals and its
utility (importance degree), which can be formalized as EU (GSi ) = Pr(GSi )U (GSi ) where GSi
is a goal set of all possible goal sets. The use of expected utility can avoid agents trying to
achieve the goals with the greatest utility irrespective of the possibility of achieving them.
After a set of goals is selected, these goals will motivate the agent’s planning process.
3.4.2. Agents’ Planning

The design of a multi-agent system is to implement specified functions and achieve specified
goals. Agents in such a system are assumed to be able to perceive the environment and carry out
actions to implement the design objectives. The system’s current state and the agents’ choice of
action jointly determine a probability distribution over the system’s possible next states. An
agent prefers to be in certain system states (e.g., goal states) to others. To achieve its goals, an
agent must reason about its environment (as well as behavior of other agents) and determine a
strategy (i.e., the agent’s mapping from state history to action [Sandholm 1999]; also called a
plan, a course of action, or a policy) that is likely to lead to the goals, possibly avoiding
undesirable or inconsistent states along the way. The agent may not know the system’s state
exactly in making its decision on how to act, however, it may have to rely on the current beliefs
and base its choice of action on a probabilistic estimate of the state.
The deliberation process hidden in the filter function of a BDI agent is indeed a planning
procedure, resulting in a set of paths the agent having selected or preferred. Intentions can be
regarded as the conditions that inevitably hold on each of the selected path [Singh et al. 1999].
To generate such a set of paths, the agent has to plan a series of strategies that provide long-term
consideration for selecting actions towards specific goals. Each strategy “attacks” a solution
space in a different manner. The agent has to select the appropriate strategy from the alternatives.
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The capability of agents’ strategy selection can enhance the flexibility and adaptability of a
multi-agent system to dynamic and uncertain environments. To achieve this objective, there are
several issues to be addressed, including: (1) an uniform representation of various strategies to
assist the agent’s comparison and evaluation process, (2) a meta-level reasoning mechanism for
strategic decision making, (3) a set of characteristics that agents use to evaluate alternative
strategies, and (4) adaptability or learning ability to improve the decision making required to
select a strategy [Barber et al. 2000].
Basically, for the first and second issues addressed above, Bayesian networks, influence
diagrams, decision trees, and expected utility functions can be applied to represent the structures
of strategies, model their causal reasoning mechanism, and compare and evaluate various
strategies. For the third issue, multi-attribute utility functions and expected utility functions can
be applied and the characteristics to be considered include requirement imposed by the strategy,
cost of strategy execution, solution quality, domain requirements, and so forth. For the fourth
issue, decision trees, Bayesian networks, influence diagrams, MDPs, or POMDPs are applicable
which provide continually learning ability. Specifically, for any strategy, given a probability
distribution over the possible outcomes of an action in any state, and a reasonable preference
function over outcomes, we can define an expected utility function on outcomes such that
whenever the agent would prefer one strategy than another, the preferred strategy has higher
expected utility. The task of the agent then seems straightforward—to find the strategy with the
maximum expected utility. To calculate the expected utility of a strategy, all actions need to be
concerned. For a course of action, the expected utility of the current action depends upon the
expected utility of next action.
3.4.3. Coordination to Agents’ Planning

In order to solve goals which require the action of multiple agents, coordination mechanisms are
needed that can coordinate the agents’ planning processes and integrate the resulting individual
plans. Coordination is a choice of action that takes into account the anticipated actions of the
other agents [Huhns and Stephens 1999, Gmytrasiewicz and Noh 2002]. Agents can coordinate
their activities in a cooperative or a self-interested manner. Being cooperative means that the
agents are non-antagonistic and they can cooperate to perform tasks or achieve desired goals.
Being self-interested means that the agents are competitive and each of them tries to maximize
28

its own benefit. Note that an agent may be both cooperative in some cases and self-interested in
other cases. No matter whether in a cooperative manner or in a self-interested manner the agent
behaves, since they are in a shared environment, they need to coordinate their activities to
achieve their goals.
Cooperative coordination can be implemented in the form of teamwork [Tambe 1997] or
coalition formation [Luce and Raiffa 1957, Sandholm and Lesser 1997]. Teamwork (or coalition
formation) in multi-agent systems is a process where agents form teams (or coalitions) and work
together to solve a joint problem via coordinating their actions within each team (or coalition)
[Sandholm 1999]. Teamwork takes place among cooperative agents and the agents’ objective of
forming a team is to maximize the system benefit while coalition formation takes place among
self-interested agents and each agent’s objective of joining a coalition is to maximize its own
benefit although they show cooperative behavior as a coalition.
Self-interested coordination is generally implemented through negotiation (agents also can form
a coalition through negotiation in the case of coalition formation). Negotiation is a process by
which two or more agents make a joint decision to coordinate their activities, each trying to
reach an individual goal or objective [Huhns and Stephens 1999, Raiffa 1982]. The negotiation
protocol is a straightforward iterative process of agents making offers and counteroffers. From an
individual agent’s point of view, negotiation is a decision problem that requires a decision maker
(agent) to weigh preferences and to choose an action that gives the maximum utility from the set
of actions allowed by the negotiation protocol.
In the cooperation case, typically, to cooperate successfully, each agent must maintain a model
of the other agents, and also develop a model of future interactions [Huhns and Stephens 1999].
From each agent’s point of view, teamwork or coalition formation is also a decision problem that
requires the agent to weigh preferences or benefits and to choose the way of joining and working
in a team or a coalition.
To model the agent’s decision making in the negotiation or cooperation process, Bayesian
networks and influence diagrams can be used. In addition, to describe a series of state transition
processes from the original states to the desired goal states, MDPs and POMDPs can be used.
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In most multi-agent encounters, the overall outcome depends critically on the choices made by
all agents in the scenario. This implies that in order for an agent to make the choice that
optimizes its outcome, it must reason strategically. That is, it must take into account the
decisions that other agents may make, and must assume that they will act so as to optimize their
own outcome. Game theory gives a way of formalizing and analyzing such concerns. Game
theory can be used to study what happens when rational and self-interested agents with different
goals interact, each making its own decisions on the basis of what is best for itself, while taking
into account that the others are doing the same [Parsons et al. 2002]. Nash equilibria and Pareto
equilibria in the game theory can be used to motivate each self-interested agent to behave in the
desired manner.
3.5. Decision Theory and Agents’ Means-Ends Reasoning

In this section, we will discuss the decision-theoretic requirement in multi-agent systems from
the aspect of agents’ means-ends reasoning processes. Our discussion involves the last two
components of the BDI architecture: intentions and the action selection function, which compose
an agent’s means-ends reasoning process (deciding how to do). Compared to the decision
making on strategies in the agent’s deliberation process, the decision making occurring in this
process can be regarded as tactical decision making (on specific action selection).
Intentions play a central role in the Belief-Desire-Intention model: they provide stability for
decision making, and act to focus the agent’s practical reasoning. The obvious property of
intentions is that they tend to lead to actions. To achieve an intention, an agent needs to carry out
some course of actions that it believes would best satisfy the intention and this intention will
constrain the agent’s future practical reasoning. Since intentions are inevitably held conditions
on each of strategies, the representation of intentions must be incorporated with the
representation of strategies. So Bayesian networks, influence diagrams, or decision trees can be
applied.
The strategies generated in an agent’s deliberation process can help the agent to observe the
environment, evaluate alternatives, and schedule actions. For any given problem, various
strategies may be available. Although a strategy may help to achieve success through carrying
out a course of action, it does not guarantee success. The failure of goal achievement may result
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in iterative intention filtering and replanning in the strategic deliberation process. However, the
agent also needs to do tactical decision making in the means-ends reasoning process.
Due to possible non-determinism, an action of the agent may lead to many possible states
(resulting outcomes). Decision theory provides a means of handling the non-determinism of an
agent’s actions [Parsons et al. 2002]. The likelihood of the resulting states can be specified by
probability distribution over the states of the world. The process of determining the probabilities
of different outcomes (i.e., the probability distribution) has been called a probabilistic temporal
projection [Boutilier et al. 1999, Gmytrasiewicz and Lisetti 2002]. The projection is a function
from the current information about the state and the action to the resulting state:
P ( S ) × A → P ( S ) where P (S ) is the family of probability distributions over all possible states

of the world, S, and A is the set of all actions currently possible.
In the uncertain environment, an agent may have a set of possible actions to select to take, each
of which has a range of possible outcomes since the actions are not deterministic. The various
possible outcomes of non-deterministic actions have degrees of value incurred, so an agent has
preferences among the different outcomes. The value of taking a particular action will depend
upon what the state of the world will be after taking this action. To choose an action to
undertake, the agent will need to look at the utility value of the state it is in after the action.
Doing this for each possible action, the agent can then choose the action that leads to the state it
values most. The utility function in utility theory can be used as a numerical scalar on agents’
preferences. Nearly in all places where evaluation and comparison of alternative solutions needs
to be done before the best solution is selected, the utility function can be applied. However, only
building a utility function to order the preferences is not enough. Such an agent only tries to
achieve the most valuable state irrespective of the difficulty and the possibility of achieving it.
To build more sensible agents, the probability of an outcome occurrence needs to be taken into
account together with the utility computation [Parsons et al. 2002]. The expected utility theory
can be used here. The expected utility of an action can be calculated with a weighted average of
the utility of each possible outcome, where the weight is the probability of that outcome given
the

action

EU ( Ai ) =

being

performed.

Since

each

outcome

is

itself

a

state,

we
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Pr( S j | Ai )U ( S j ) where S is the set of all states after executing the action. The

S j ∈S
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agent then selects action A* where A* = arg max EU ( Ai ) = arg max
Ai ∈ A

Ai ∈ A

Pr( S j | Ai )U ( S j ) where A

S j ∈S

is the set of all possible actions. The use of expected utility can avoid agents trying to achieve the
state with the greatest utility irrespective of the possibility of achieving it, and on the other hand,
can avoid agents trying to achieve the state, which has the greatest chance of being achieved
irrespective of its value.

4. Decision-Theoretic Applications in Multi-Agent Systems
With regard to a variety of decision-theoretic requirements in multi-agent systems discussed in
section 3, it is very natural to see numerous decision-theoretic application scenarios in multiagent systems. In this section, we will present some typical and explicit decision-theoretic
applications from the perspective of the series of concepts and methodologies described in
section 2.5: probability distribution, multi-attribute utility functions, expected utility functions,
decision trees, Bayesian networks, influence diagrams, MDPs, POMDPs, Nash equilibria, and
Pareto equilibria.
4.1. Applications of Probability Distribution

In multi-agent systems, when the environmental change and the outcome of an action (or a set of
actions) an agent carries out are certain, the agent can precisely estimate the states or outcomes,
and does not need to consider any possibility. However, the open design paradigm of a realistic
multi-agent system may result in uncertainty. The possible reasons include: there may be
perception errors during the interaction between the agent and its world, there may be multiple
designers in the design of a multi-agent system who do not know precisely others’ objectives,
and other agents’ behavior may change the expected outcome of an agent’s action. In such a
situation, in order to accurately capture the likelihood of states or outcomes, it is very natural for
the agents to estimate the occurrence probabilities of all the possible environmental states or all
the possible outcomes of carrying out an action with probability distribution provided by
probability theory. Correspondingly, the use of probability distribution in multi-agent systems
can be classified into two fields: the computation on the occurrence probability of uncertain
information in agents’ beliefs, and the estimation on the non-determinism of actions’ outcomes.
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4.1.1. Probability Distribution and Agents’ Beliefs

The probability distribution on the agents’ beliefs is generally applied to estimate the accuracy
degree of the agent perceiving the present environment and other agents. In an uncertain
environment, the environmental status changes within a specific range. An agent may know all
the possible occurrences but it does not know the current occurrence exactly. Even in a certain
environment, the possible noise in the environment may make an agent’s perception to the
environment and recognition to other agents incomplete (or even inaccurate). In these cases, the
agent needs to estimate the current environmental state transformation, the completeness degree
and accuracy degree of its knowledge about the world.
In [Gmytrasiewicz and Noh 2002], Gmytrasiewicz and Noh present the implementation of
knowledge bases of the agents that accommodate uncertainty and nested information agents may
have about the world. Their design of the knowledge base is based on work on frame-based and
object-oriented knowledge representation formalisms [Brachman and Levesque 1985]. A
fundamental limitation of the frame formalisms is that they do not support uncertainty. Their
design combines the frame formalisms with Bayesian networks. The basic idea is to treat the
slots of frames (or attributes of objects) describing the properties of objects in the world that may
not be known with certainty as nodes of a Bayesian network. Such probabilistic slots allow
values in form of probability distributions. This knowledge base design will be described further
in the later section about the applications of Bayesian networks in multi-agent systems.
In [Gmytrasiewicz and Lisetti 2002], Gmytrasiewicz and Lisetti study the role and usefulness of
emotional states and personality in designing multi-agent systems. The emotional states of an
agent are viewed as the agent’s decision making modes, predisposing the agent to make its
choices in a specific, yet rational, way. The personality of an agent consists of the agent’s
emotional states together with the specification of transitions taking place among the states. To
enable an agent to model the personalities and emotional states of other agents that it interacts
with, the authors provide a precise definition of a personality model of other agents. From the
perspective of an agent Q, a personality model of another agent R is a probabilistic finite state
machine PR =< D, IN , ∆, N > , where D is a finite set of emotional states of agent R, IN is a set of
environmental inputs, ∆ is a probabilistic state transformation function, ∆ : D × IN × D → [0,1] ,
and N ∈ D is an initial (or neutral) emotional state of agent R. Agent Q, which has a personality
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model of agent R, can use it to probabilistically predict R’s emotional state, given an initial state
and an environmental input. The state transformation function is probabilistic to allow for
uncertainty as to the next emotional state of the modeled agent R. Agent Q assigns a probability
distribution to all the possible emotional state transformations due to an environmental input in
IN. With such a model, an agent can build its belief on the personality of another agent. The
main advantage of using this probability distribution based model is that a personality model can
be learned, given limited amount of observations of the other agent’s behavior. Then the
probability distribution can be dynamically changed through learning.
4.1.2. Probability Distribution and Outcome of Agents’ Actions

The probability distribution on the outcomes of agents’ actions is generally applied together with
the utilities of outcomes, and the application objective is to calculate expected utilities of actions.
Generally, an agent cannot precisely predict the probability distribution of the outcomes of its
action at the beginning but it can track the outcomes of the same action and get the probability
distribution from the past experience.
In [Banerje and Sen 2002], Banerje and Sen develop a payoff-structure model for partner
selection in coalition formation problem. They consider situations where a rational agent decides
on which partnership to interact with given the number of interactions and possible payoffs. Each
agent interaction is assumed to ultimately generate some utility for each of the interacting agents.
An agent can get one of several payoffs or utilities for joining a particular coalition, and there is
a static probability distribution that governs which of the payoffs is received at any particular
interaction. So here the probability distribution indicates the possible payoff distribution of
agents’ coalition joining actions. The payoff-structure encoding in the form of a probability
distribution over possible payoffs is used as the summary information on which the agent must
base to make its decision.
In [Soh et al. 2003], Soh et al. use probability distribution to evaluate the outcome of negotiation
between agents. This is a simple but typical case of probability distribution application in multiagent systems. The possible outcomes of a negotiation action include success and failure. The
negotiation success means the possible cooperation between agents. An agent profiles the
negotiation outcome with each peer agent in the history and gets the dynamic probability
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distribution on negotiation outcomes. Then based on this probability distribution and other
factors, the agent can calculate the expected utility of selecting each peer agent in the future
cooperation and then decide which agents to approach for negotiations.
4.2. Applications of Utility Functions

The use of utility functions (and expected utility functions) is very wide in multi-agent systems
since each agent has its own preferences and desires about how the world is and the preferences
and desires can be conveniently and formally captured by means of a utility function. Although
in some multi-agent systems the utility functions are not given explicitly (e.g., [Bazzan et al.
2002]), the agent’s evaluation on different alternatives is generally built upon a certain set of
attributes and corresponding weights.
4.2.1. Multi-Attribute Utility Functions

Balogh et al. built a multi-agent system for negotiation and decision support [Balogh et al 2000].
The main entity of the system is a negotiation center which uses decision algorithms to rationally
apportion goods and services into parts with equal utilities (Cut Cake algorithm) to ensure fair,
fast, and efficient behavior. In order to enable the system to compute utilities, negotiation center
needs to know the utility functions of particular goods and services. Individual utilities are
functions of elements such as price, amount, time, etc. This is a simple application example of
multi-attribute utility functions in multi-agent systems.
In [Barber et al. 2000], an application example of strategic decision making is presented. The
planning process requires as input the current state of the world, the actions available, and a goal
state to generate strategies. These three items are maintained by the agent and dynamically used.
The world state is constantly changing through the actions of other agents, and the actions
available to achieve any given goal change based upon the agents who are helping to achieve the
goal. For the purpose of conflict resolution during strategy selection, the multi-attribute utility
function is applied here to evaluate the strategies from different aspects. The attributes include
the quantified states, and payoffs of actions.
An attribute in a utility function can be a domain factor (like time of executing a task) or a
characteristic of the agent (like virtues an agent shows during interaction with others). In
[Bazzan et al. 2002], one of the attributes contributed to the utility computation is the agents’
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moral sentiment (i.e., emotions like generosity towards others and guilt for not having played fair
with someone). The selfish rational agents act to maximize their gain in the short term while
altruistic agents are led by moral sentiments and sacrifice rational decisions in some degree.
Based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma problem [Axelrod 1984], Bazzan et al. conduct a series of
experiments and show that the selfish rational agents maximize their earnings in the short term
but compromise their performance in the long run, while altruists with moral sentiments may not
have the best performance at the beginning but normally end up much better than others. This
result indicates that the agent’s emotional stance is used as one attribute in the calculation of
utility. The moral sentiments make an altruisitc agent choose what is not best for its own goals
but they are long-term utitliy maximizers.
In decision theories desires are usually formalized in terms of utility functions. In [Dastani et al.
2002], the authors study desires represented with utility functions in a dynamic environment.
Desires of agents are assumed to reflect their utility functions that in turn reflect their
preferences. They look for a formal model in which the utility functions are typically constant,
desires are relatively stable, whereas goals change much more frequently. They model the
agent’s dynamic desires in the context of practical negotiations where agents can reach
agreements by influencing other agents’ desires. Rational agents in negotiation decide what
action to take based on their desires that reflect their utility functions. Since negotiation is
usually modeled by game theory and in game theory the utility function is assumed to remain
constant during a game, they have to solve an apparent contradiction: on the one hand, it is
reasonable to assume that the agent’s desires can be changed during negotiation and on the other
hand the utility function which is reflected by the rational agent’s desire has to remain constant
during negotiation. They solve this apparent contradiction by lifting the utility function to a
desirability function and allowing the lifting condition to change on the basis of some context
parameters. Then agents’ utility functions can remain constant while their desires can
dynamically change. This makes the agents’ behavior more flexible. The application domain of
the multi-agent system is washing clothes in one washing machine. There are two utilities in the
utility function: washing time, and certainty of electricity delivery.
In [Kephart and Greenwald 2002], Kephart and Greenwald study markets consisting of shopbots
and other agents representing buyers and sellers in which shopbots and agents are economically
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motivated, strategically pricing their information services and selecting search strategy
respectively so as to maximize their own profits. Whenever a rational buyer is fully informed by
shopbots, it makes an optimal decision regarding which search strategy to employ to find the
lowest-priced seller among a randomly chosen set of sellers, given the current state of the
market. The optimal decision making is based on a multi-attribute utility function that specifies
the expected profit per unit time of a seller. The attributes include the quantified search strategy,
the seller’s price, and the cost of production for seller.
4.2.2. Expected Utility Functions

In [Li and Soh 2004], Li and Soh create a multi-phase coalition formation model integrating
case-based reasoning and reinforcement learning. Coalition formation is implemented through
argumentation-based negotiations [Soh and Tsatsoulis 2001] between agents. For a negotiationresponding agent to decide whether to accept, reject, or counteroffer a request, it uses a utility
function with the attributes corresponding to the domain information, agents’ cooperation
relationship, and so on. To compute the utility of a case, multiple multi-attribute utility functions
are used and form a hierarchical structure, i.e., the outcome of one utility function is used as one
attribute in another utility function. To select agents as coalition candidates, the authors build an
expected utility function to compare the expected utilities of the actions of selecting candidates.
They set different utility values for all possible coalition formation outcomes. To get the
corresponding probability values of outcomes, they adopt the neighbor profiling technique. Each
agent keeps track of its coalition formation history with others and records each neighbor agent’s
coalition execution success rate, coalition execution failure rate, negotiation success rate, and
negotiation failure rate, to estimate the probabilities of different coalition formation outcomes.
In [Excelente-Toledo and Jennings 2003], agents can dynamically select coordination
mechanisms based on expected utility functions. When deciding which of its coordination
mechanisms to adopt, the agent computes the expected utility of each of them and selects the one
that maximizes this value. The agent’ aims are to maximize their reward, in particular their
average reward per unit time. Each agent keeps track of its own average reward, and uses this
reward to decide how much to charge for its own services and occasionally to approximate the
expected average reward of other agents. Taking account of the reward and the success
probability of a coordination mechanism, the agent can compute the expected utility of the
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coordination mechanism. Here the alternative coordination mechanisms and their success
probabilities are defined at the beginning and are constant.
In [Vane and Lehner 2000], Vane and Lehner propose an approach to the standard two-player
zero-sum single-stage normal game that maximizes expected gain while quantifying possible
loss. Agents use this formulation to select a plan based on its assessment of an opponent’s intent,
its assessment of an opponent’s unpredictability, and its utility model of the situation. The plan
selection problem is represented using an extended hypergame formulation and the plans are
evaluated using hypergame expected utility. Each candidate plan is called a hyperstrategy and
the hyperstrategy can determine a probability matrix. This probability matrix represents the
expected probability (a weight) of each entry in the full game. The hypergame expected utility is
then determined by performing a dot product of this matrix with the utility values in the full
game. Such an expected utility function is more complex than a generic expected utility function.
The authors conduct a series of experiments to conclude that hypergame expected utility is a
robust, useful evaluation of the desirability of any hyperstrategy.
4.3. Applications of Decision Trees

As a decision making and decision-analysis tool, a decision tree can aid the decision maker to
produce policies, and visualize the structuring and solving of decision situations. Decision trees
can be used conveniently in multi-agents systems since there are mature decision tree algorithms
available (e.g., C4.5 [Stone and Veloso 1998, Chiu and Webb 1988] and C5.0 [Nair et al.
2004a]).
However, although decision trees are widely used for classification tasks, they are typically not
used for agent control. In [Stone and Veloso 1998], Stone and Veloso use decision trees for agent
control in a complex multi-agent domain, Robotic Soccer, based on the confidence factors
provided by the C4.5 decision tree algorithm. They incorporate a previously trained decision tree
into a full multi-agent behavior that is capable of controlling agents throughout an entire game.
Along with using decision trees for control, this behavior also makes use of the ability to reason
about action-execution time to eliminate options that would not have adequate time to be
executed successfully.
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An agent may model others to predict their future actions. But the possible constraints of
inadequate or contradictory relevant historical evidence can result in low prediction accuracy, or
otherwise, low prediction rates, leaving a set of cases for which no predictions are made. In
[Chiu and Webb 1988], Chiu and Webb use decision trees, specifically the C4.5 decision tree
algorithm, for agents’ modeling to others, and aim to improve prediction rates without affecting
prediction accuracy. An agent-modeling system based on C4.5 is used to model agents’
competencies with a set of decision trees, trained on all historical data. Each tree predicts one
particular aspect of the agent’s action. Predictions from multiple trees are compared for
consensus. The agent-modeling system makes no prediction when predictions from different
trees contradict one another. This strategy trades off reduced prediction rates for increased
accuracy.
Decision trees are often used for agents’ learning about own decisions (e.g., [Stone and Veloso
1998]) or for modeling others (e.g., [Chiu and Webb 1988]) in the presence of large amounts of
data. Unlike these approaches that use decision trees as a model of prediction of agent behavior
in unseen cases, Nair et al. [Nair et al. 2004a] use decision trees as a model to explain observed
agent behavior, i.e., using decision trees as a decision-analysis tool. They develop an automated
team analyst called ISSAC for post-hoc, off-line agent-team analysis on agents’ behavior in
teamwork. ISSAC employs multiple presentation techniques that can aid human understanding
of the analyses. Decision trees can help to extract key features that discriminate between success
and failure of critical actions, and extract rules for “what-if” analysis. The user submits logs of
the team’s behavior along with what are considered to be critical events, and also along with
chosen features. The individual agent model uses the C5.0 decision tree algorithm to come up
with rules that explain these examples, and when a user selects a particular rule, show the user all
those cases of examples satisfying the selected rule.
In [Sridharan and Tesauro 2002], Sridharan and Tesauro study the use of single-agent and multiagent Q-learning to learn seller-pricing strategies using a regression tree approximation scheme
to represent the Q-functions. Q-learning is one of a variety of ways of endowing agents with the
“foresight” ability to anticipate long-term consequences of actions for planning strategies to
achieve desirable goals. As a special type of decision trees, regression trees [Breiman et al.
1984] are used here to represent the Q-functions. As with all regression techniques it is assumed
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that there is a single response variable and one or more predicator variables. If the response
variable is categorical then classification or decision trees are created. If the response variable is
continuous then regression trees can be produced. Predicator variables can be a mixture of
continuous and categorical variables. The final output is a tree where the decision maker decides
which branch to follow after applying some test to one or more variables. Sridharan and Tesauro
use axis-parallel splits, select splits that minimize variance, and approximate the function by
constant values in the leaf nodes. The trees are constructed in a “batch” mode using a fixed set of
training cases. Each training case has some input attribute values, and an associated function
value which may be adjusted during training. Through the application of regression trees, stable
seller pricing strategies can be learned out.
4.4. Applications of Bayesian Networks and Influence Diagrams

In recent years, the applications of Bayesian networks and their extensions called influence
diagrams in multi-agent systems are becoming popular (e.g., [Gmytrasiewicz and Noh 2002],
[Vassileva and Mudgal 2002]). It is very natural since Bayesian networks represent probabilistic
relations among uncertain variables describing the domain at hand and there are varieties of
relations between an agent and its environments and there are a great amount of uncertainty
factors in these relations. Together with probability distribution and utility function, Bayesian
networks and influence diagrams play a significant role in agents’ reasoning and planning based
on Bayes’ theorem (see Section 2.5.4). Bayesian networks concern probabilistic relationship
among uncertain variables but do not concern utility and decision variables. They are not
appropriate for modeling complex decision making processes. Generally, an agent’s decision
making processes can be modeled using an influence diagram, a Bayesian network extended with
utility function and decision variables. Here we present their applications together just because
their application scenarios are very similar. In some applications, the authors do not even clearly
distinguish them and just use the two terms alternatively (e.g., in [Gmytrasiewicz and Noh
2002]).
In [Gmytrasiewicz and Noh 2002], Gmytrasiewicz and Noh present the implementation of
knowledge bases of the agents that accommodate uncertainty and nested information agents may
have about the world. As stated in Section 4.1.1, their design of the knowledge base combines
the frame formalisms with Bayesian networks. The slots of frames (or attributes of objects)
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describing the properties of objects in the world that may not be known with certainty are treated
as nodes of a Bayesian network, or an influence diagram. Such probabilistic slots also contain
information about the slots’ parent nodes in the influence diagram, as well as the conditional
probability tables that allow the probabilities to be updated in response to change in the parents’
probabilities. In the implementation, as new objects are identified by the agent, they are
automatically represented as objects belonging to appropriate classes in the frame-based
knowledge base, and automatically become part of the influence diagram representation of the
agent’s decision making situation. As the authors proved, each influence diagram has a
corresponding and unique payoff matrix representing the same decision making situation.
Through combining the traditional knowledge representation form with Bayesian networks, the
limitation of traditional form in representing uncertainty can be overcome. More importantly,
decision theory provides a good theoretical support to the use of Bayesian networks and the
Bayesian representation is more helpful to the decision making of agents in dynamic and
uncertain environments than the traditional frame-based or object-oriented form as the
application of Bayesian networks makes it possible to generate the Bayesian representation of
decision making situation on-the-fly.
In [Vassileva and Mudgal 2002], the influence diagram technique is used in agent negotiation
with incomplete and uncertain information, in the context of a distributed multi-agent peer help
system supporting students in a university course. Personal agents bilaterally negotiate on their
behalf to acquire help from other agents. The agent’s decision making takes into account the
preferences of the user, which depend on the domain of the negotiation. Ideally (as often is
assumed in cooperative environments) negotiating parties have full knowledge about the
opponents. When the agents are self-interested, however, it is unlikely that an agent is willing to
share its private preferences with other agents. To cope with the uncertainty inherent in a
dynamic environment with self-interested participants and negotiate more effectively, an agent
models the preferences of the opponent using an influence diagram illustrated in Figure 4.1. The
agents negotiate iteratively and create preference models of their opponents during negotiation,
which help them predict their opponents’ actions and make decisions better. In Figure 4.1, the
only deterministic node represents the certainty and other chance nodes represent the uncertainty.
The right side is a sub influence diagram for the opponent model. The outcomes of the
opponent’s action node are the probabilities that an opponent can decide to accept, reject, or
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counteroffer. At every step the agents choose between these protocol actions by calculating the
maximum expected utility for the actions. The domain-specific utility functions are created and
incorporated into the probabilistic inference diagram. The utility of a negotiation decision
depends on the role in which the agent is at the moment of decision making. The utilities of
different roles at different states vary according to their risk behaviors.
Other Component
Helpers Available
Money
Importance

Urgency

Risk
Attitude
Urgency
My Price
Opponent’s
Action

Decision

Risk
Attitude
Money
Importance

Utility

Figure 4.1. A practical influence diagram used in agents’ decision making.

The application of influence diagrams is facilitated by its relatively unconstrained dependency
structure at the level of relation. Since in Bayesian networks the inference based on Bayes’
theorem have obtained wide applications in many areas, the application of influence diagrams
has a solid theoretical background. To update the inferred probabilities to reflect the changing
state of the world, Bayes’ update rule can be used to recalculate the probabilities.
4.5. Applications of MDPs and POMDPs

Markov decision processes (MDPs) apply to the decision problems where the state information
can be observed completely and have been used as the basis for much work in decision-theoretic
planning. In most real-world decision problems, the problem settings are of state uncertainty
where the state information is partially observable. Partially observable Markov decision
processes (POMDPs) are more flexible as they permit uncertainty of observations and state
information acquisition.
In multi-agent systems, there have been a variety of applications based on MDPs and POMDPs
such as the multiagent Markov decision process (MMDP) model [Boutilier 1996], the identical
payoff stochastic game (IPSG) and the partially observable identical payoff stochastic game
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(POIPSG) [Peshkin et al. 2000], the decentralized Markov decision process (DEC-MDP) model
and the decentralized partially observable Markov decision process (DEC-POMDP) model
[Bernstein et al. 2002], the communicative multiagent team decision problem (COM-MTDP)
model [Pynadath and Tambe 2002], the Dec-POMDP-Com model [Goldman and Zilberstein
2003], and the distributed POMDP model [Nair et al. 2004b]. MDPs and POMDPs are applied to
model the state uncertainty in inter-agent coordination. In coordination, the agents may
communicate to exchange information and synchronize behavior dynamically. Here, some
applications integrate communication into the model while others not.
The MMDP model [Boutilier 1996] is a general model to coordinate the policies of individual
agents in n-person cooperative games in which agents share the same utility function. Boutilier
adopts MDPs as the underlying (single agent) decision model because the research interest is in
planning under uncertainty with competing objectives and (potentially) indefinite or infinite
horizon. An MMDP is formalized as a tuple of (1) a finite set of states, (2) a finite set of agents,
(3) a series of finite sets of actions corresponding to each agent, (4) a probabilistic state transition
function, and (5) a real-valued reward function. Each agent has prior beliefs about the policies of
other agents and these beliefs are updated as the agents act and interact. The MMDP model is a
multi-agent extension to the completely observable MDP model, so it assumes an individually
fully observable environment. The MMDP model has no communication.
The IPSG model [Peshkin et al. 2000] is a multi-agent MDP model and the POIPSG model is a
multi-agent POMDP model. They are developed for multi-agent decision making in cooperative
stochastic games, where the agents may have their own individual goals and preferences but
share the same payoff structure. The POIPSG model is a tuple of (1) a set of states, (2) a
probability distribution over the initial state, (3) a set of agents, where each agent is a 3-tuple of
its discrete action space, discrete observation space, and observation function, (4) a probabilistic
transition function, and (5) a reward function. This tuple is a generic one for multi-agent
POMDPs. In the one-agent case, the model is essentially same as a generic POMDP model.
When all agents have the identity observation function for all states, i.e., each state is uniquely
determined by an observation, the game is completely observable. Then the model is an IPSG
model. The POIPSG model restricts the agents to share a single payoff function, appropriate for
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modeling the single, global reward function of the team context. There is no communication in
either model.
The DEC-POMDP [Bernstein et al. 2002] model is a general decentralized model. In this model,
the decision process is controlled by multiple distributed agents, each with possibly different
information about the state. A DEC-MDP is a DEC-POMDP with the restriction that at each time
step the agents’ observations together uniquely determine the state. The tuple of a DEC-POMDP
is consistent with the generic tuple of multi-agent POMDPs described above. There is no
communication in either model.
The COM-MTDP model [Pynadath and Tambe 2002] is a decentralized POMDP model and its
application domain is the team coordination in teamwork. It is originated from STEAM [Tambe
1997] that is developed based on the BDI (Belief-Desire-Intention) model and extends joint
intentions with decision-theoretic communication selectivity. The COM-MTDP model also has
extension to explicitly represent communication. So the tuple of a COM-MTDP includes a new
component representing communication. The communication is introduced to find locally
optimal joint policies that allow agents to coordinate better through synchronization achieved via
communication. Compared to the previously described models, the most significant difference of
this model is there is communication.
The Dec-POMDP-Com model [Goldman and Zilberstein 2003] is a decentralized POMDP
model for the decentralized control of cooperative multi-agent systems. There is communication
in this model for dynamic information exchange between agents. Within the model, cooperative
agents are represented by finite state controllers, whose actions control the process. The model
treats both standard actions and communication as explicit choices that the decision maker must
consider. The goal is to derive both action policies and communication policies that together
optimize a global value function. In the model there are alternate communication and action
phases.
The distributed POMDP model [Nair et al. 2004b] is evolved from the COM-MTDP model and
is also for modeling multi-agent teamwork. Its tuple is very similar to the generic tuple of multiagent POMDPs without communication as an explicit component of the tuple. But there is a
communication action introduced into the tuple that can be initiated by any agent just like a
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generic action initiated. Unlike the COM-MTDP model and the Dec-POMDP-Com model,
where there are alternate communication and action phases, there is no separate communication
phase in this model. In a particular epoch an agent can either choose to communicate or act. This
setting models the missed opportunity cost that occurs when the agents communicate instead of
acting.
4.6. Applications of Nash Equilibria and Pareto Equilibria

In multi-agent systems of self-interested agents, each agent tries to maximize its own benefits. In
order to solve goals that require the action of multiple agents, coordination is needed and a joint
option of agents may be arrived in which each agent’s option is acceptable to it. Nash equilibria
have been used widely in multi-agent systems to achieve a joint option or just used as an analysis
tool for agents’ self-interested behavior. Pareto equilibria have also been used in multi-agent
systems to achieve a joint option when self-interested agents show a cooperative behavior.
In [Kephart and Greenwald 2002] (also see Section 4.2), Kephart and Greenwald build a multiagent system of a set of self-interested agents: shopbots, buyers, and sellers, all of which are
economically motivated to maximize their own profits. To get a joint option of sellers seeking to
maximize profit, the authors derive a Nash equilibriuma vector of prices at which sellers
maximize their individual profits, and from which no seller has any incentive to deviate. If all
buyers choose sellers at random, the unique Nash equilibrium is such that all sellers charge the
monopoly price. Otherwise, there may exist multiple Nash equilibria. Specific to such issues as
when there are multiple equilibria and how the shopbot can control which equilibrium is reached
regardless of initial conditions, Kephart and Greenwald point out the trick is to use a timedependent pricing strategy to strategically manipulate the equilibria and their basins of attraction
so as to guide the market towards the desired equilibrium.
In [Markopoulos and Ungar 2002], Markopoulos and Ungar explore the role of shopbot and
pricebot software agents in electronic service markets. They consider a stream of customers that
arrive in a market and choose a seller from which they receive service based on their expected
utility costs. The authors analyze the possibility of getting Nash equilibrium. They address that
there exists no symmetric pure Nash equilibrium in a one-shot game that the sellers face, since
the sellers are identical and will only set their price once, making such equilibria unrealistic.
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Even pricing at zero is also not an equilibrium since instead of making zero profits a seller would
raise his price and increase revenue from buyers that occasionally come and find all other sellers
with non-zero expected queue waiting time. Consequently, the market cannot be in equilibrium.
In [Scully et al. 2004], Scully et al. present a solution to coalition calculation in a dynamic multiagent environment. In order to obtain a true valuation of any coalition, they use the concept of
Pareto equilibrium. They propose an algorithm called E-Pareto, which is based on a multiobjective optimization evolutionary algorithm combining multiple-objective decision making
and evolutionary computation. The combination of Pareto equilibria and the evolution algorithm
allows for the approximation of the Pareto optimal set of coalitions. A distance weighting
algorithm is also incorporated to maintain diversity when searching for the Pareto optimal
solution set, and to encourage search in areas of solution space that have been previously
successful. The proposed technique is capable of eliciting metric importance and adapting to
metric variation over time.
4.7. Summary

In this section, we have listed and described a variety of application examples of typical
decision-theoretic concepts and methodologies in multi-agent systems. It can be seen that their
applications are often interdependent. Different concepts and methodologies may be used in a
same scenario at the same time for different purposes, and one concept or methodology can be a
part of another one. For example, probability as well as probability distribution is a key concept
in decision making and it appears in expected utility functions, decision trees, Bayesian
networks, influence diagrams, MDPs, and POMDPs.

5. Conclusions
In this report, the basic mechanisms in decision theory, probability theory, utility theory, and
game theory, the main applicable aspects of these theories in multi-agent systems, and their
various applications have been presented.
In a multi-agent system, each agent has its own beliefs about how the world is, has desires about
how it would like the world to be like, and has intentions about how it can make the world to be
like. An autonomous agent needs to make decisions based on currently held beliefs to take
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specific actions and achieve specified goals. These aspects correspond to the primary elements in
a decision problem: states of nature, decision alternatives, and payoffs.
Due to the uncertainty in agents’ viewpoint to the environment and other agents, and the
uncertainty of outcomes of action in real-world environments, agents often need to make
decisions for the estimation of states of the world, prediction and evaluation of outcomes of
action, strategy planning, achieving the joint option of multiple agents, and so on. For effective
decision making, special theoretic concepts and methodologies are needed. Up to date, some
typical ones have been applied into multi-agent systems, for examples, probability distribution,
(expected) utility functions, decision trees, Bayesian networks, influence diagrams, Markov
decision processes (MDPs), partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs), Nash
equilibria, and Pareto equilibria.
In this report, we have described these concepts or methodologies, and discussed their
application areas in multi-agent systems from the perspective of BDI architectures. The BDI
architecture is consistent with the human practical reasoning and provides the functional
decomposition, which enable us to understand and discuss the decision-theoretic requirement in
multi-agents more clearly and more systematically. We also describe a variety of example
applications of these theoretic tools in multi-agent systems. Although these decision-related
theories have been used in multi-agent systems very widely, some tools are not used sufficiently.
For example, the use of Bayesian networks and influence diagrams is often limited within the
representation of the specific causal relationship rather than the bi-directional inference.
What we also need to point out is that some applications of concepts and methodologies are too
complicated in cases of large sets of data like the use of decision trees, Bayes networks,
influence diagrams, MDPs, and POMDPs. How to model complex decision problems with
appropriate decision-theoretic concepts and methodologies, how to effectively represent the
complex structure of a diagram of a large set of decision information, and how to efficiently infer
in diagrams are crucial problems.
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